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HARTMANN, KOLB, PIPPIN
AND THE UNHAPPY CONSCIOUSNESS

Kevin Thomson
Carleton College
"Meta" discussions in philosophy are a bit like the media talking
about the media, Le.. they are prone to generating a lot of heat and
seldom any light. On the other hand, more "disciplined" exegetical
efforts have a way of implicitly taking stances on macro-interpretive
issues, with the defect of being assumed and hence not argued for.
With these twin dangers in mind, I propose to examine the motiva
tions of the thinkers who are currently offering up Neo-Kantian
domestications of Hegel. I am referring to the interpretations put
forth by Klaus Hartmann, David Kolb and Robert Pippin. I will first
sketch their interpretations and will then show how even in the Logic
Hegel disallows for the thought/ object dualism which so stubbornly
clings to their interpretations. Next, I will argue that Hegel implicates
the reader in the system and thereby provides hermeneutical guid
ance. (I will argue that Hartmannian approaches are accotmted for in
the Unhappy Consciousness section of the Phenomenology a/Spirit.) I
will conclude by bringing out an implicit aspect of Pippin which
pOints to an ontological reading of Hegel. Because Hartmann has the
most crystnlline position (and asH isperhaps the originofthe others),
I propose to start with his essay "Hegel: A Non-Metaphysical View."
Hartmann reads the Logic as a reconstruction. It must be
presupposilionless and so there must be a prOvisionally granted
(being-in-itself/implicit) content which via necessary progressions
(the process of becoming-for-itself/ explicit) acquires determinacy.
In this manner, thought is the urnnoved mover which "grounds"
itself. But Hartmann takes "thought thinking itself" rather literally.
Which is to say that he sees the whole process as thought playing
with itself. For Hartmann, there is a radical bifurcation between
thought and reality (nature), "Hegel'S philosophy appears to us as
categorial theory, i.e., as non-metaphysical philosophy, or as a phi
losophy devoid of existence claims" (Hartmann, p. 274). Accordingly
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he sees thought as innocuous: "Similarly. if one says that the archi
tectonic is an imposition on pre-existing material. such criticism is
mistaken, since the architectonic can be taken as an innocuous
orderingin the interest of ra tionality" (Hartmann, p. 275). There is no
fear of the categories imposing on nature because they have been
developed based on the "satisfaction of reason" instead of fit with
nature.
We might better understand the moves he is making by consid
ering the differences between geometry and engineering. Geometry
might be said to satisfy the demands of reason (admittedly not in the
same way as Hegel's categories) whereas engineering is instead
concerned with empirical fit with nature. Just as geometry treats the
idea of a triangle, so engineering treats the actually existent triangle.
And just as Hegel's categories (in the Philosophy ofRight) deal with
the idea of a state, so the political theorist deals with the actually
existent state. It is important to note that Hartmann is not merely
offering a descriptive account of Hegel's behavior but also norma
tive guidance. When Hegel gets carried away and "goes metaphysi
cal," it is seen by Hartmann as an illicit though forgivable rhetorical
flourish:
the fault of Hegel's may be ... that he makes conces
sions to existential considerations.... thus creating
existential bonds between society and the state. This
move is understandable, in the sense of" forgivabJe,"
in view of historical precedent and even language.
but cannot be defended in theory.... If we thought
these flaws away, the account of the state would be
more abstract, but also more correct (Hartmann, p.
282).

As Hartmann's essay proceeds. he becomes more candid about
saddling Hegel with an interpretation which doesn't fit. He labels
any indigestible aspects of Hegel as "maximal" claims which are in
turn "indefensible." In a crucial admission, Hartmann reveals the
criteria which have been driving his reading all along:
We feel free to single out that systematic core of
Hegel's philosophy which exhibi ts strictness. In that
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sense, the interpretation presented here can stand for
a "minimal" interpretation, or for a non-metaphysi
cal interpretation, of Hegel (Hartmann, p. 286).
Hartmann repeatedly says that the value of his interpretation is that
it delivers strictness. Herr Hartmann began his essay by staking out
the reading he is most anxious to derail,
[Findlay] claims that in Hegel we have a system of
affinities or of non-strict, loose, probabilisticimplica
tions between concepts.... The difficulty is, however,
that on this view Hegel's theoretical achievement,
the dialectic, hinges on an irrationality, on likelihood
and affinity rather than on strictness" (Hartmann, p.
268).
The reader is advised to remember terms like "non-strict," "loose"
and "probabilistic." It will be instructive to watch how these same
terms (and the agenda/proclivities they announce) show up in our
other Neo-Kantians (though the whipping boy does change from
Findlay to Taylor).
Before I draw out any conclusions, I want to get my other two
commentators on board. I find a strong internal tension present in
Kolb's and Pippin's interpretations of Hegel. I sense they want the
. purity and necessity that a transcendentalist reading will provide,
but are more cognizant (than Hartmann) of the senses in which
Hegel resists this imposition. Nevertheless, at key pOints I find the
Hartmannian sympathies manifest. I will first identify those areas
and will later include the sense in which Kolb and especially Pippin
point to a metaphYSical (by which I mean ontological) reading of
Hegel which they are perhaps too concerned with "rigor" to endorse.
Kolb has slightly more in common with Hartmann, so I will treat
him next. As indicated, I am going to first accentuate those aspects
of Kolb which paranel Harhnann. Kolb sees the logic as the core of
Hegel's system. He also views Hegel as doing Kantian transcenden
tal analysis: "Hegel's logic will be a metaphYSiCS in this Kantian
sense, a study of the necessary structure of thought" (Kolb, p. 41).
According to Kolb, the order of Hegel's categories is systematic and
necessary. He also depicts the movement of the categories as going
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from implicit to explicit, or from simpler to richer determination. For
Kolb, the logical categories develop autonomously; they are "self
sufficient." Whatever his misgivings, Kolb lines up squarely behind
Hartmann with this move:
We would expect that the "absolute knowledge" at
tained at the end of the Phenomenology of Spirit and
worked out in the system would be a definitive
ontology stating what is real and what is not. Instead
itis a transcendental deduction of what is valid (Kolb,
p.87).

Kolb, like Hartmann, is conscious of the fact that sometimes
Hegel doesn't behave himself. When Kolb can not convincingly
recast what Hegelis doing in terms of transcendental analysis, he too
is willing to dismiss such anomalies as rhetorical or juvenilia (or
both):
Sometimes Hegel uses images suggesting that the
universal is some vaporous force or energy or life
circulating through things. Hegel never entirely shook
off the rhetorical influence of the romantic images he
used in his youth (Kolb, p. 62).
On the thorny issue of concrete reality, Kolb has this to say:
[that] Hegel's discussions of concrete reality ... con
tinue the development of the logical categories ... is
not easy tounderstand,anditisnothelpedby Hegel's
vague and metaphorical deSCriptions of the relation
of the logical idea to concrete reality (Kolb, p. 85).
I think Kolb is drawn to transcendental analysis for some of the
same reasons Hartmann is. Kolb is also anxious to derail irrational
spirit monism:
When I say the logic is not a metaphysics, I want most
of all to preclude the idea that Hegel provides a
cosmology including the discovery of a wondrous
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new superentity, a cosmic self or a world soul or a
supermind (Kolb, pp. 42-43; emphasis added).
Kolb also is concerned to wean us of our existentialism-or in his
words, our "voluntarism." Kolb is well aware that talk of separate
logical categories is precarious, but for him there is a larger threat,
Talking oflogical categories as if they were things on
their own is dangerous. But still more dangerous
talking as if categories of thought were tools that we
make and shape at will. English-speaking philoso
phy has a strong voluntaristic bent (Kolb, p. 48).
I think this is a telling formulation in that we are invited to consider
what the opposite of "voluntarism" might mean. Does scientism
come to mind? While Kolb may not consciously endorse scientism,
I mention it because it resonates with the profile I have been
constructing. What might philosophical scientism look like? I sus
pect that (like Hartmann) not too far behind Kolb's adoption of
transcendental analysis lie concerns with strictness, rigor, necessity,
discipline, closure and certainty and their correlate fears of irratio
nality, looseness, contingency ambiguity, mysticism, romanticism,
arbitrariness and relativism. One wonders if Hartmann and Kolb are
willfully putting a spin on Hegel in the interest of rigor. But then
Kolb tells us (approvingly) that this is precisely what Hartmann is
doing:
I

On the question of what Hegel was doing, Hartmann
does not seem to go far enough. On the more important

issue ofwhatis possibleforour thinking today,Hartmann 's
proposal is more cautious and more acceptable than
Hegel's. In fact, Hartmann is not so much trying to
interpret Hegel as to correct him and make him
useful today. He takes the idea of categorial justifica
tion to be the core of Hegel's thought, but a core
betrayed by Hegel's full system. Corrected and made
more rigorous, Hegel can be important today (Kolb, p.

94; emphasis added).
PreCisely what might it mean to make Hegel "more rigorous"? I
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don't think it means deeper. In fact, I'm fairly sure it means more
disciplined, ie., more algorithmically rule-governed. Before I show
how this obsession with rigor is just an entrance ramp to the "high
way of despair," I must first get some hardware from my third Neo
Kantian.
Pippin hopes in his conceptual scheme that idealism can be a
middle ground between the poles of "precritical metaphysics" and
"the bloodless dance of the categories." But on my reading of Pippin,
this middle ground amounts to colluding the two poles in a very
sophisticated though, in the end, misleading way. As with Kolb,
there is a deep tension in Pippin's interpretation. Accordingly, I will
proceed in a similar manner. I will first argue why it is helpful to look
at Pippin in light of Hartmann, and later I will have recourse to the
other strand of his thought.
Pippin is Hartmannian in that he is offering a transcendental,
nonmetaphysical interpretation. It is transcendental in that Hegel is
seen as responding to a question like "What are the conditions for the
possibility of having a conceptual scheme?" The sense in which it is
nonmetaphysical is a bit more complicated. Early on, in a footnote,
Pippin gives us an initial due as to what nonmetaphysica] might
mean: "Hegel is, like Kant, an' antirealist,' not a metaphysicall'ealist"
(Pippin, p. 262). By "antirealism," Pippin is referring to the sense in
which objects cannot exist independently. The germ for this "antire
alism" is the Kantian discovery that there must be an T which
accompanies my representations-that the subject's "hard-wired"
concepts are ineluctably constitutive of experience. This appercep
tive theme is the tool Pippin uses to build his bridges between Kant
and Hegel. 1 By "metaphysical realist," Pippin is referring to those
readings of Hegel which suggest that there is some extra-subjective
force (call it Geist, Oversoul, Supermind, God) existing in the world.
By portraying Hegel as an antirealist, the locus quickly shifts to
apperception/ self-consciousness. Pippin takes very seriously the
idea that thought determines itself-hence the title Hegel's Idealism:
The Satisfactions of Self-Consciousness.
This apperceptive theme applied to the Logic yields a reading
which views the progression of the categories as an autonomous.
1 Regarding Hegel's purported anti-Kantianism, Pippin tells us, "Hegel's rhe
torical bark is worse than his appropriating bite when it comes to Kant" (pippin, p.
248).
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organic self-actualization. One might label this an "internalist" read
ing, "So to ask whether the fundamental elements of OUI cone tual
scheme are true is to ask if they' agree with themselves' or p:: e d
from the se1f-,d~termining power,of th~ N otion itself , (Pippin. p. ~4~).
When ,de~~nbmg thou~~~. (notion~ty) Pippin cOnsistently uses
terms like autonomous, mternal, self-determination" and "sel£
grounded." B~t these terms ha,ve a cash value only if they are
understood With reference to theIr correlates (Le., externality, other
wise determined or grounded). This is the key ambiguity in Pippin•s
interpretation.
The very term, "conceptual scheme," suggests a subject who
employs it and an object realm to which it is applied. I sense that
Pippin would not appreciate this formulation, but I'm wondering if
he isn't trading on our intuitions regarding the meaning(s) of this
term, Ludwig Siep, in a review of Pippin's book, suggests that this is
ind eed how Pippin is understanding" conceptual scheme": "It looks
as if he [Pippin] still understands the conceptual scheme as a means
of reference to extra-subjective and extra-conceptual reality." He
later adds, "Hegel at the end of the Logic claims to have shown once
and for all that there is no 'outside' and no . other' for the self
determination of the concept" (Siep, pp. 74-75).
The crucial queslion facing Pippin is, "Is there any meaningful
sense in which we can speak of an 'outside' to the scheme?" If not,
then talk of schemes becomes misleading. My sense is that the term
was chosen with care and that Pippin is not in a hurry to relinquish
it. It is a piece of hardware he needs to make a clean distinction
between thought and object (between the necessary, rule governed
behavior of the notion, on the one hand, and mere externality, on the
other). This leads us to the question of why Pippin would be
interested in a bifurcation between thought and object in the first
place. This brings us back to Hartmann and Kolb. In their cases, I
pointed out that by their own admissions, they were subverting
Hegel in the interest of "rigor." I suspect and will now attempt to
show, that a similar motive is behind Pippin's Kantian reading.
Motivations are a very difficult thing to get our hands on, but
Pippin provides us some indication in the text. He ini~ally justi~es
his Neo-Kantian approach "with the hope that there IS some pllllo
sophically useful payoff in reading Hegel so intensely in the light of
Kant's actual project" (Pippin, p. 7; emphasis added). Pippin also
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appears to be aware of the sense in which his interpretation doesn't
accord with Hegel's ambitions, "Ibelieve that Hegel's texts [have] the
resources for reacting him this way without anachronism, and with
philosophical merit, but it is certainly true that Hegel himself seems
often much more ambitious about his system" (Pippin, p. 259). What
is the "philosophically useful payoff" which justifies this revision of
Hegel? Thomas Wartenberg speculates that the "payoff" is the un
earthing of a systematic core behind Hegel's dialectical excesses:
The guiding principle of their interpretations is there
fore to isolate the argumentative sh"Ucture that will
allow the name "Hegel" to stand for an intelligible
position on contemporary philosophic issues. For this
reason they seek to unveil the "rational core" behind
the "mystifying shell" of Hegel's idealism
(Wartenberg, p. 121).
I think this impulse also stands behind Pippin's polemics against
spirit monism. He, like Hartmann and Kolb, uses terms like psychol
ogy, pre-critical. romantic, pragmatic. existential, mysterious, loose,
ambiguous, arbitrary, etc. when he is denigrating metaphYSical
readings.
Hartmann. Kolb and Pippi n are uni ted in that they are all 0 ffed ng
interpretations of Hegel which see him as answering Kantian tnm
scendental questions as opposed to ontological questions. They also
are similar in their recognition that Hegel himself would not counte
nance their readings and finally. their interpretations are driven by
an urge to find strictness, rigor and discipline in HegeL I am going to
argue that in their zeal for necessity they are driven to a formalism
characteristic of what Hegel called the "understanding." This fixa
tion with rigor, "cannot see when it has reached its limit; nor, if it has
transgressed that limit does it perceive that it is in a sphere where the
categories of understanding, which it still continues rudely to apply,
have lost all authority" (Logic, p. 289). I will now consider how welt
their interpretation accords with Hegel's texts.
In surveying some of the recent Hegel scholarship, one notices
how contentious the issue of relation amongst Hegel's texts is. In fact,
the choice of which Hegelian text is primary goes a long way towards
determining one's stances on a whole host of macro-interpretive
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issues. Accordingly. most N eo-Kantians see the Logic as the primary
text (the others are merely derivative applications of the dialectical
method). The Logic also is (conveniently) the easiest text to view
through a Kantianlens. So as not to construct a straw man, I will show
how even in the Logic (esp. the Doctrine of the Notion) their reading
leaves key moves Wlaccounted for.
Toward the end of the Doctrine of Essence. Hegel is more circum
spect on the issue of contingency than our N eo-Kantians would have
us believe: "we must guard against being so far misled by a well
meant endeavor after rational knowledge, as to try to exhibit the
necessity of phenomena which are marked by a decided contin
gency" (Logic, p. 206).2 What I am interested in taking issue with is the
formalism which stands behind their desire for rigor. On this ques
tion Hegel has much to say. In the beginning of the Doctrine of the
Notion, Hegel chastises those who would posita Platonic-like bifur
cation between logical forms and the content to which they apply:
The Logic of the Notion is usually treated as a science
of form only, and understood to deal with the form of
notion, judgement and syllogism as form, without in
the least touching the question whether anything is
true. The answer to that question is supposed to
depend on the content only. If the logical forms of the
notion were really dead and inert receptacles of con
ceptions and thoughts, careless of what they con
tained, knowledge about them would be an idle curi
osity which the truth might dispense with. On the
contrary they really are, as forms of the notion, the
vital spirit of the actual world (Logic, p. 226).
Hartmann's portrayal of thought as "innocuous" or as a "luxury"
simply does not comport with either the spirit or (as we see here) the
letter of Hegel's writings. For Hegel, the Idea (the culmination of his
system) is defined as the unity of subject and object, of the ideal and
the real. of the finite and the infinite, of soul and body (Logic, pp. 276~
77). Externality, particularity and contingency are preserved in the
2Here Hegel is simply reiterating Aristotle's guidance from the Nico11l11chean
Ethics, "it is the mark of an educated man to look for precision in each class of things
just so far as the nature of the subject admits" (Aristotle, pp. 24-261094b).
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reconciliation-not abstractly negated. It is for this reason that Hegel
has a home for existentialists in his system. An interpretation which
reintroduces a cleavage between thought and existence we might
tentatively name "Kantian dualism." Pippin refers to it as "the
problem of 'returning' to the empirical world, once one rejects
empiricism or a naturalist realism in favor of original, constitutive
conditions" (Pippin, p. 259). I submit that here Pippin (through his
interpretation) is foisting Kant's problem onto Hegel. Hegel remon
strates ad n.auseam on the incorrigible urge to indulge the "Either-Or"
of the Understanding,
the Logic of Understanding ... believes thought to be
a mere subjective and formal activity, and the objec
tive fact, which confronts thought. to have a separate
and permanentbeing. But this dualism is a half-truth:
and there is a want of intelligence in the procedure
which at once accepts. without inquiring into their
origin, the categories of subjectivity and objectivity
(Logic, p. 255).
This is all a rather long winded way of saying Hegel has some
thing to say on hermeneutical issues. I submit that the context which
informs (en-forms) the Logic is thoroughgoing. Another way of
evincing this feature is to ask the question. "Is the meaning of the
categories in the Logic exhaustively defined by their place in the
dialectical process?" Is the Logic an enclosed architectonic of words
and ideas which then stand in opposition to externality? [Pippin's
"unreal" particulars] (Pippin, p. 236). On my view. it is not. I read the
Logic as part of a system which exhibits a thoroughgoing monism.
There is a sense in which the Logic isn't a whole but as a moment of
the Hegelian corpus, is the whole. This essay might be seen as an
application of this insight. It does so by conSidering the sense in
which the reader is implicated in the system. It is symptomatic of
Hartmann's formalism that in his approach he assumes Hegel pro
vides no guidance regarding the application of "strictness" as the
criteria which adjudicates interpretations. What appears to be a
meta-textual issue is. for Hegel, subsumed in the system.
Hegel opens the Doctrine of the Notion by asserting, "The Notion
is the principle of freedom" (Logic, p. 223). This is not mere hyperbole,
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nor are the political overtones unintended. I think Hegel (like the
Greeks and against modernity) sees epistemology and ontology as
fundamentally linked (if not speculatively identical). Said another
way, epistemology (truth) and ethics/politics (virtue), for Hegel,
should not and can not be radically divorced from each other. I think
this sentiment is behind his rather paradoxical use of "freedom" in
a book on logic.
One might ask, "So, how and where does Hegel implicate the
reader and provide hermeneutical guidance?" I will argue that a
Hegelian response to Neo-Kantian domestications of his thought
can be found in the Self-Consciousness section of the Phenomenology
of Spirit. To make my project more manageable, I will argue that
Hartmann's Either-Or (either thought or reality) can be seen as an
example of the inwardly disrupted nature of the Unhappy Con
sciousness (insofar as I have been successful in bringing to light the
Hartmanniansympathiesin Kolb and Pippin, then this characteriza
tion will also hold for them).
The Unhappy Consciousness is marked by a thoroughgoing
bifurcation between universality and particularity:
the simple Unchangeable, it takes to be the essential
Being; but the other, the protean Changeable, it takes
to be the unessential. The two are, for the Unhappy
Consciousness, alien to one another; and because His
itself the consciousness of this contradiction, it iden
tifies itself with the changeable consciousness, and
takes itself to be the unessential Being, it must at the
same time set about freeing itself from the unessen
tial, i.e. from itself (PS. p. 127),
Many commentators see the Unhappy Consciousness exemplified
in the Christian-esp. in Kierkegaard. I think one can find a secular
correlate in what I have dubbed "Kantian dualism." The desire to
posit a beyond (noumena) of knowledge is the very same quest for
"the unchangeable"-in this case for the apriori. This is matched by
an equally vehement renunciation of contingency-of "the protean
changeable." LudWig Siep. while criticizing Pippin's transcendental
reading of Hegel, also sees a connection between Christian and
philosophical longing for transcendence: "the conception of a be
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yond for our knowledge and desire is at the same time that basic
feature of the Christian religion, which transfers true reality into a
'transcendence'" (Siep. p. 67). Kant's noumenal realm, the Christian
God and Hartmann's attempt to carve out a realm for necessity are
linked in their construction of a "beyond." Further, the Christian's
conception of sin is equivalent to the Hartmannian renunciation of
contingency in that they are both a denial of the body-the a
posteriori, the changeable, the inessential, the deviant, the messy,
gritty, playful vitality that is life.
Hartmannlongs for purity; he feels soiled by the shadows on the
cave wall. These mere appearances will not deliver the stable cer
tainty he yearns for. In this regard he reminds us of Nietzsche's
depiction of the ascetic priest. 3 Out of impotence, the priest (Uke
today's logicians) wallows in his life inimical resentment. Perhaps
truth is less like Hartmann's geometry and more like Nietzsche's
woman. 4 Are we trapped on the "highway of despair"-tragically
forced to choose either Hartmann's barren formalism 01' Nietzsche's
(& Rorty's) free spirited relativism? Hegel hoped reason could
provide some kind of reconciliation between universal and particu
lar, between subject and object, between the ideal and the real,
between the actual and the rational. Hegel tells us we need, "To
recognize reason as the rose in the cross of the present and thereby
to delight in the present" (Philosophy of Right, p. 22).
I conclude with a suggestion. I see aspects of Pippin's account
3 Rorty adds an interesting (and I think in this case ilpplicable) gloss on
Nietzsche's description of the ascetic priest. "Such a person shares Niutzsche's
endlessly repeated desire for, above all else, cleanliness. He also shares Hcidegger's
endlessly repeated desire for simplicity. He is likely to have the same attitude
toward sexual as to economic commerce: he finds it messy. So he is inclined both to
keep women in their traditional subordinate place, out of sight and mind, and to
favor a caste system which ranks the manly warriors, who bathe frequently, above
the smelly traders in the bazaar. But the wan'ior is, of course, outranked by the
priest-who bathes even more frequently and is still manlier. The priost is manlier
because what is important is not the fleshy phallus but the immaterial om.'-the one
which penetrates through the veil of appearances <lnd makes contact with true
reality, reaches the light at the end of the tunnel ina way that tho warrior never ciln"
(Rorty, p. 72).
~ "Supposing truth is a woman-what then? Are there not grounds for the
suspicion that all philosophers, insofar as they were dogmatists, have been very
inexpert about women? That the gruesome seriollsness, the clumsy obtrusiveness with
which they have usually approached truth so far have been awkward and very
improper methods for winning a woman's heart?" (Nietzsche, p. 2; emplUlsis added).
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which, if altered, point to the kind of ontological reading I am more
sympathetic with. If we substitute logos for conceptual scheme, we
can ameliorate the sharp schism between subject and object which
plagues Pippin's Kantian interpretation. Kolb provides a working
definition:
For the Greeks, logos (speech, argument, reason, gath
ering together) names that common principle of defi
niteness and unity that makes thinking, speaking and
acting possible .... logos is the primal gathering that
forms and allows unity within any sphere of beings
or thought" (Kolb, p. 57).
Whereas "c!?nceptual scheme" is more like language (and hence
suggests a user and a realm of objects to which the scheme applies),5
logos is closer to a shared, intersubjective historical context-our
collective horizon (or Geist if you prefer). And in that sense it has a
way of gathering the subject and the object together. It allows for the
monism Hegel had in mind. In short, I think Hegel is a live enough
option without Kantian ornamentation.

5 For 11 tight treatment of "concep tual scheme" ,lOd the problems it is plagued by
see Davidson, D. "On tho Very Idea of a ConceptuD,! Scheme."
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